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Abstract
This paper studies the duration pattern of …xed-term contracts and the determi-
nants of their conversion into permanent ones in Spain, where the share of …xed-term
employment is the highest in Europe. We estimate a duration model for temporary
employment, with competing risks of terminating into permanent employment versus
alternative states, and ‡exible duration dependence. We …nd that conversion rates are
generally below 10%. Our estimated conversion rates roughly increase with tenure,
with a pronounced spike at the legal limit, when there is no legal way to retain the
worker on a temporary contract. We argue that estimated di¤erences in conversion
rates across categories of workers can stem from di¤erences in worker outside options
and thus the power to credibly threat to quit temporary jobs.
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Several European labor markets have been characterized by a wide use of permanent con-
tracts withstringent and costly …ring regulations. Inthe mid-1980s, in order to …ght the high
and persistent levels of unemployment, some European countries enhanced the ‡exibility of
their labor markets by allowing employers to hire workers on a …xed-term basis, with negli-
gible termination costs upon expiry of contract. Typically, there exists a legal duration limit
in the use of these contracts, after which an employer can either o¤er the worker a contract
of undetermined duration or dismiss her. Since their introduction, …xed-term contracts have
been widely used and they accounted for most new hirings in all sectors and occupations,
especially in countries characterized by high levels of employment protection (OECD 1993).
European labor markets have become more dynamic in terms of higher in‡ows and out‡ows
between unemployment and employment, but the overall level of unemployment did not
seem largely a¤ected by the introduction of …xed-term contracts.
The consequences of the introduction of temporary (or …xed-term) contracts have raised
interest and concern among both academics and policy-makers (see Booth et al. 2002a and
OECD 2002). Some consensus has formed among economists that the introduction of tem-
porary contracts does not necessarily increase employment, while creating dualism in the
labor market (see, among others, Bentolila and Dolado 1994, Blanchard and Landier 2000
and Güell 2000). An important aspect of the use of temporary contracts is their pattern
of promotion into regular contracts of inde…nite duration. Mixed employment e¤ects of the
introduction oftemporary contracts andrising dualismprovide someclear signal that tempo-
rary contracts largely failed to provide workers withe¤ective “stepping stones” to permanent
employment.
In this paper we study the determinants of the conversion of temporary contracts (TCs)
into permanent contracts (PCs) as well as the duration pattern of TCs. In doing this, we
focus on one country, Spain, mostly because it represents an extreme experience in several
labor market dimensions. Compared to other OECD countries, Spain has the highest rate
of unemployment, and ranks second in terms of strictest employment protection legislation
(OECD 1999). This situation triggered an experiment of “‡exibility at the margin”, started
in 1984 with the introduction of TCs. This reform was somewhat more radical than in other
European countries. In particular, while in some countries TCs are restricted to some type
2of workers or sectors,1 the Spanish 1984 reform did not limit in any way the applicability
of TCs. At the same time, the 1984 reform set an “up or out” clause after three years of
continuous employment in a TC. Upon expiry of this legal limit a temporary employee has
to be promoted to a permanent contract or dismissed.
Soon after their introduction, coinciding with the expansion of the late 1980s, more than
90% of newly created contracts have been …xed-term,2 and this translated into a rapidly
growing stock of temporary employment, from 11% in 1983 to approximately 35% by the
early 1990s, which is more than three times the European average (see OECD 1987, 1993).
However, during the same time span, unemployment remained as high as before the reform.
Within adecade, theSpanishlabor markethadexperienced recordrates ofgross jobcreation,
but little permanent employment had been created as only a small fraction of TCs had been
converted into PCs. The labor market had gradually evolved towards a dual structure, with
two thirds of employees retaining a permanent status and the rest working in a highly mobile
market. Interestingly enough, once these e¤ects became evident, Spanish policy makers
restricted the applicability of TCs and o¤ered …scal incentives for their conversion into PCs
(1994 reform). Later reforms (in 1997 and 2001) continued to limit the applicability of TCs
as well as o¤ering incentives to convert TCs into PCs (see Appendix A for more institutional
details).
There exists a growing literature which studies several aspects of the impact of TCs on
labor markets in OECD countries, with special reference to the Spanish case (see Dolado
et al. 2002a for a comprehensive survey). However, there is an important aspect which is
to date largely underexplored in this literature, namely the study of the conversion of TCs
into PCs and its timing. This paper tries to shed light on the economic mechanisms behind
conversions of TCs and their implications for the dualism of the labor market.3 We argue
that some of the patterns found on the timing of conversion rates of TCs may be suggestive
of variation in temporary workers’ outside option and their ability to threat employers to
quit current temporary jobs in search for better matches.
In order to understand dualism in the labor market, it is useful to distinguish between
1See Grubb and Wells (1993) and OECD (1993, 1994 and 1999) for a detailed description of …xed-term
employment regulations in Europe.
2Bover and Gomez (2004) …nd that exit rates from unemployment into temporary employment are ten
times larger than exit rates into permanent employment.
3Closely related to our work is the recent growing literature on the role of Temporary Help Agencies, and
thus a speci…c typology of TCs, as potential springboards towards permanent employment, see Ichino et al.,
2005, Autor and Hauseman, 2005, and references therein.
3entry into and exit from temporary jobs. It can certainly be argued that in several institu-
tional settings the entry into temporary employment is a …rst stepping-stone into permanent
employment, and indeed the probability of accession to permanent employment is higher for
those on TCs than for the unemployed (see Farber 1999 for evidence for the US). This state-
ment holds trivially for Spain, in which over 90% of accessions to permanent employment
happen as conversions of TCs, as shown in Figure 1. As the entry margin displays little
variation, the main source of dualism in the Spanish labor market lies in the exit margin,
i.e. in the conversion of TCs into PCs, which is the focus of this paper.
We estimate a duration model of temporary employment using the panel version of the
Spanish Labor Force Survey (EPA), started in 1987. We believe that duration models best
describe the dynamics of the transition process between temporary and permanent employ-
ment by exploiting the strength of a panel data, which is the possibility of being able to
track individuals over time and observe exactly how long they take to make an employment
change. Moreover, the use of individual information on worker characteristics that can be
obtained from the EPA shows how the prospect of permanent employment is shared among
temporary workers, and to what extent there are some categories that are more likely than
others to remain trapped in temporary jobs. The additional advantage related to the use
of EPA data is the length of the period covered by the survey. We use data for the period
1987-2002, which allows us to assess the conversion pattern of TCs introduced in 1984, as
well as analyze the e¤ects of the later reforms.
The existing literature contains only a few contributions on conversion rates for Spain.
Amuedo-Dorantes (2001) examines the determinants of Spanish employers’ conversions of
temporary contracts into permanent ones using information on the composition of …rm level
employment. She …nds that dismissal costs hardly a¤ect contract conversions, which mostly
respond to employment expectations and union pressure for increased employment stability.
In our study we focus on individual rather than …rm-level conversion rates, in order to
estimate the time pattern of conversions. Most existing studies on the determinants of
individual conversion rates use logit speci…cations (Toharia 1996 and Alba 1998), which may
prove rather in‡exible when applied to the analysis of the dynamic path of transition rates.
To our knowledge, the only duration study on Spanish conversion rates is Amuedo-Dorantes
(2000), whoestimates transitions out oftemporary employmentusingEPA individual records
from 1995:2 through 1996:2, and …nds that conversion rates are very low, regardless of job
tenure. Our paper uses a longer sample period to study the time pattern of permanent
4conversions. In doing this, we allow for variation of conversion rates both over tenure levels
(within job matches) and across di¤erent categories of workers.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 proposes a simple framework for the use and
conversion of TCs, which should guide our empirical analysis. Section 3 describes the data
set used. Section 4 illustrates the duration model to be estimated. Section 5 presents the
results and Section 6 …nally concludes.
2 A simple framework
This section proposes a simple theoretical framework that illustrates …rm use of TCs and
their conversion into PCs. Our goal here is to derivetestable implications for the relationship
between conversionrates andcontract durationfor di¤erent categoriesof workers. The model
proposed in this section is the simplest possible that would deliver our testable predictions.
A number of extensions to this bare-bone model are described in Appendix B.
TCs can …rstly be used by employers for covering seasonal or casual jobs - and, with
limited exceptions, this was indeed the only use of TCs that was permitted in Spain until
1984. As shown in Figure 2, the proportion of TCs represented by seasonal jobs is fairly low,
and has been virtually una¤ected by the 1984 reform. What the reform has greatly a¤ected
is the incidence of TCs in non-seasonal jobs. When covering general, non-seasonal jobs, TCs
may be used as a screening device in cases in which the productivity of a job-worker pair
is not directly observable upon hiring. In this perspective, job matches are interpreted as
“experience goods”, in the tradition of Jovanovic (1979, 1984). In a high-…ring-cost scenario,
the introduction of TCs would therefore provide employers with the adequate instrument for
experiencing the quality of a match within the legal limit.4
But there are also reasons why, eveninthe presence of perfectly observable match quality,
employers may rely on TCs simply as a cheaper and more ‡exible factor of production within
thewholelegal durationlimit, as TCs involve lower termination costs and generally pay lower
wages than PCs.5 However, as a worker on a TC is more likely to quit in order to accept
a better match, …rms using TCs are trading o¤ lower labor costs with a higher quit rate
and the risk of losing productive matches. Clearly, such trade-o¤ depends on whether a
4PCs also allow for a legal probation period free of …ring costs, which ranges between two weeks and 6
months for di¤erent categories of workers. TCs allow de facto a probation period of 3 years.
5Jimeno and Toharia (1993) and De La Rica (2004) …nd that temporary workers in Spain earn approxi-
mately 10% less than permanent ones, after controlling for observable personal and job characteristics.
5temporary employee can exert a credible threat to quit, and thus her outside options, and
on how easily she can be replaced.6
Below we characterize the optimal conversion rate of TCs, taking into account that a
higher conversion rate increases future termination costs but at the same time prevents
quits. In doing this, we assume for simplicity that worker productivity is observable upon
start of contract, so as to abstract from screening motives in the use of TCs. This allows
us to focus on the impact of worker outside options and binding legal limits on conversion
rates. At the end of this section we will brie‡y discuss how the testable implications of our
simple model can be a¤ected in the presence of unobservable productivity and screening.
We assume that the productivity of a job-worker pair is match speci…c, and independent
of the type of contract used. On the one hand, PCs are more expensive for the …rm as they
can only be destroyed with costly …ring procedures. On the other hand, TCs cannot be used
inde…nitely, and the law establishes a legal duration limit upon which …rms have the choice
of converting a TC into a PC or destroying the job. But …rms may choose to convert TCs
into PCs well before the legal limit, depending on workers’ threat to quit.
We model …rm decisions in discrete time. Firms post vacancies and meet workers accord-
ing to some contact technology. Upon contact, a …rm and a worker observe the productivity
of a potential match, pi, which can be thought of as a realization from a probability distrib-
ution. High enough realizations of pi become productive matches.7 Any match is created as
temporary,8 and can last as such for at most two periods. The up-or-out clause applies at
the end of the second period.
In the …rst period, a TC produces pi and pays a wage wT
1i. At the end of the …rst period,
the match may be hit by an idiosyncratic shock and become unpro…table, with an exogenous
probability s, in which case the worker is dismissed with zero …ring costs. If the match is
still pro…table, the …rm can convert the TC into a PC (thus before the legal limit), and this
happens with probability R1. If a worker is not o¤ered a permanent conversion, she may
decide to quit the …rm with probability q. Quits on TCs are modeled as a function of a
6See also Booth et al. (2002b) for a discussion of alternative roles of TCs and an application to UK data.
7In general equilibrium the acceptance rule would be endogenous (see Pissarides 1990, chapter 6). Our
partial equilibrium predictions would be robust to this endogenization.
8This assumption is empirically grounded (see Figure 1). However, a richer model in which matches with
high enough productivity are created as permanent from the start would simply provide a further reason for
quits on TCs without a¤ecting our comparative statics.
6worker’s outside options a,
q = q(a); (1)
with @q=@a > 0.9 If the worker does not quit, the job remains temporary in the second
period, during which it still produces pi and pays a wage wT
2i: At the end of the second
period, the match can again be hit by a negative shock with probability s. If not, the TC
is either converted into a PC, with probability R2, or it is destroyed, as expiry of the legal
limit prevents the …rm from further renewing the job on a temporary basis. If a contract
is not renewed at this stage, from the …rm’s point of view it does not matter to further
distinguish whether for the worker this is a voluntary separation (quit) or an involuntary
one (layo¤). In other words, the quit threat no longer matters to the …rm at the end of the
second period, when match continuation on a temporary basis is no longer an option. When
a TC is converted into a PC, its productivity remains unchanged and the wage paid to the
worker is wP
i : PCs can still be destroyed with probability s, having paid a …ring cost F. We
…nally assume that the quit rate on permanent jobs is zero10 and that wages are exogenous.
Having said this, the values to the …rm of temporary jobs of tenure 1 and 2 periods are
de…ned by the following Bellman equations, respectively:
JT
1i = pi ¡ wT
1i +
1
1+ r
h
sV + (1¡ s)R1JP
i + (1¡ s)(1¡ R1)qV +(1¡ s)(1 ¡ R1)(1¡ q)JT
2i
i
(2)
J
T
2i = pi ¡ w
T
2i +
1
1 +r
h
sV + (1¡ s)R2J
P
i +(1 ¡ s)(1¡ R2)V
i
(3)
where V represents the value of a vacancy, JPi represents the value of the same job if covered
by a PC and r is the discount rate.
Similarly, the value to the …rm of a permanent job is
J
P
i = pi ¡w
P
i +
1
1 +r
h
s(V ¡ F) +(1 ¡ s)J
P
i
i
: (4)
We …nally assume free entry of vacancies in this economy, so that in equilibrium V = 0;
which in turn yields the following expressions for JT
1i, JT
2i and JP
i :
J
T
1i = pi ¡ w
T
1i +
1
1+ r
h
(1 ¡ s)R1J
P
i + (1¡ s)(1¡ R1)(1 ¡ q)J
T
2i
i
(5)
9We are assuming that quits are una¤ected by current wages, and that conversion rates are the only
instrument employers can use in order to prevent quits (see Güell 2000 for a similar framework).
10In principle, workers on permanent jobs may be searching for better job worker matches, but as new
matches would start as temporary, the quit rate on permanent jobs would be lower than that on temporary
ones. As the qualitative conclusions of the model would not be a¤ected, we assume for simplicity that such
quit rate is zero.
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T
2i = pi ¡ w
T
2i +
1
1+ r
(1 ¡ s)R2J
P
i (6)
JP
i =
1+ r
r + s
³
pi ¡ wP
i
´
¡
1
r + s
sF (7)
Upon creation of a match, the …rm maximizes its lifetime value with respect to the
conversion rates R1 and R2: At the end of the …rst period, a …rm computes the optimal
“early” renewal rate R¤
1: This is de…ned by the following …rst order condition, obtained by
di¤erentiating (6) with respect to R1:
J
P
i ¡ (1¡ q)J
T
2i = 0: (8)
As neither JP
i nor JT
2i depend onR1, this delivers acorner solution for R1; i.e. R¤
1 = 0 if JP
i <
(1¡q)JT
2i andR¤
1 = 1ifJP
i ¸ (1¡q)JT
2i: Intuitively, ifthevalueofa PCis higher than the value
of a period-2 TC weighted by its survival probability (1 ¡ q); then it is optimal to o¤er the
worker a permanent conversion. In other words, Pr(R¤
1 = 1) = Pr
h
JP
i ¸ (1¡ q)JT
2i
i
. It can
be shown that Pr
h
JP
i ¸ (1¡ q)JT
2i
i
increases with pi, as match productivity has a stronger
impact on the value of permanent rather than temporary jobs - the former being more likely
to bedestroyed thanthe latter. Therefore theprobabilityof an early conversionalsoincreases
with pi; i.e. …rms are willing to prevent quits on more productive jobs by o¤ering workers
an early conversion. Firing costs F a¤ect R¤
1 by reducing Pr
h
JP
i ¸ (1 ¡ q)JT
2i
i
, and thus the
probability of an early conversion. Finally, workers’ outside options, a, a¤ect R¤
1 through
the behavior of quits. In particular, an increase in a raises q and thus Pr
h
JP
i ¸ (1¡ q)JT
2i
i
,
which also raises the probability of an early conversion, R¤
1:
One period later, a similar decision is taken with respect to R2, which is de…ned by the
following …rst order condition, obtained by di¤erentiating (7) with respect to R2:
JP
i = 0: (9)
As JP
i does not depend on R2, this would also give a corner solution R¤
2 = 0 if JP
i < 0 and
R¤
2 = 1 if JP
i ¸ 0. Clearly, if the lifetime value of a PC is positive, it is more pro…table to
covert a TC into a PC rather than opening a new vacancy, whose equilibrium value is zero.
In other words Pr(R¤
2 = 1) = Pr(JP
i ¸ 0): As Pr(JP
i ¸ 0) increases with match productivity
pi and decreases with …ring costs F, the probability of a later renewal increases with match
productivity and decreases with …ring costs.
To summarize, if JP
i < 0; conditions (8) and (9) imply R¤
1 = R¤
2 = 0. If JP
i ¸ 0,
then R¤
2 = 1: In particular, if JP
i ¸ (1 ¡ q)JT
2i; R¤
1 = 1 and viceversa. Therefore, three
8scenarios can arise. First, matches with JP
i < 0 are never converted. Second, matches
with 0 · JP
i < (1 ¡ q)JT
2i are only converted at the legal limit. Finally, matches with
JP
i ¸ (1¡ q)JT
2i are converted before the legal limit.
Having said this, we may expect the following predictions:
1. There should be signi…cant heterogeneity in the timing of conversion that we observe
in the data. Depending on the values of JP
i and JT
2i; temporary contracts that are
never converted could coexist with both early and late conversions.
2. Higher productivity increases the likelihood of a conversion at all, but in particular it
raises the likelihood of an early conversion (scenario three above) with respect to the
one of a late conversion (scenario two). This e¤ect is due to the higher impact of pi on
JP
i than on JT
2i:
3. Following a similar argument, higher …ring costs reduce the likelihood of a conversion
at all, and, conditional on conversion, they make late renewals more likely than early
renewals.
4. Finally, better worker outside options and bargaining power increase the likelihood of
early conversions, and leave unchanged that of late conversions.
These predictionswill be testedbyestimatinga durationmodel oftemporary employment
with‡exible durationdependence, and comparingearly andlate conversionrates for thesame
type of workers and across workers with di¤erent characteristics, namely productivity, …ring
costs and outside options. In our data, productivity can be proxied by skills, …ring costs are
determined by the institutional environment and outside options are proxied by skills and
sectoral unemployment rates.
The simple framework presented here canbeextendedina number of ways (see Appendix
B for details). The extension that is probably most insightful for our purposes would allow
for imperfect information about worker productivity and thus the use of TCs as screening
devices (see also Engellandt and Riphahn 2004 for an application on Swiss data). In a
high-…ring-cost scenario, TCs would provide employers with the adequate instrument for
experiencing the quality of a match during the maximum legal limit. Under this hypothesis,
TCs that display high productivity are later converted on a permanent basis. Permanent
conversions due to successful screening may happenat any timeduring the …rst three years of
9an employer-worker relationship, although we expect “early” conversions (well before expiry
of the three years legal limit) to be more likely, since presumably the screening period should
not take as long as three years. In other words, as soon as a job match is perceived to be
productive enough, a …rm may have a su¢cient incentive to promote a temporary worker,
instead of keeping him/her in a TC for the entire legal duration. Using the notation of
our model, early renewals for successful screening can be modeled by an increase in R1,
everything else held constant. Firing for screening reasons could be modeled by raising the
probability of exogenous layo¤s on TCs (say e s) above the corresponding layo¤ probability
on PCs (s). Conditional on a worker successfully completing the screening period, the role
of pi, F and a on conversion rates remains the same as in the simple model illustrated above.
3 The data
The data used in this paper is drawn from the Spanish Labor Force Survey (Encuesta de la
Población Activa), which is carried out every quarter on a sample of some 60,000 households.
Sincethe secondquarter of1987, the EPAis arotating panel, in whicheach household can be
surveyed for amaximum ofsixconsecutivequarters. Eachquarter anewcohort ofhouseholds
is selected, and one sixth of existing households leave the sample. The EPA is designed to
be representative of the total Spanish population, and contains very detailed information
on labor force status of individuals within each household. Labor force transitions can be
studied by linking consecutive information on the same individuals, available for all cohorts
selected since 1987:2.11
Our sample includes individuals belonging to cohorts that entered the survey between
1987:2 and 2002:4, covering more than a full cycle of the Spanish economy. We select all
respondents who completed six quarterly interviews, and declared to hold a TC in any of
the interviews.
In order to give a ‡avor of labor market transitions in our sample, Tables 1 and 2 re-
port quarterly and yearly transition probabilities across three labor market states: non-
employment, permanent employment, and temporary employment. Both tables display ex-
tremely strong persistence inthe non-employment and the permanent employment states. As
expected, the temporary employment category displays signi…cant turnover, although most
of such mobility represents reshu-ing across TCs, as shown in the bottom row of Table 2.
11For a more detailed description of the EPA see: http://www.ine.es/dacoin/dacoinci/epalsti02.htm
10In our duration model, we concentrate on individual transitions out of the …rst TC that
is observed during the survey period. This leaves us with 162,092 temporary employment
spells. The duration of each contract is constructed using self-reported information from the
various quarterly interviews. Given that no contract identi…er is supplied, in order to follow
each single TC across interviews we rely on information concerning (i) the type of contract
held; and(ii)the uncompletedduration of thepresent contract. The type of contractheld can
be permanent or temporary. The uncompleted duration of the present contract is expected
to rise across interviews with calendar time, and to drop to zero whenever there is a contract
switch. We therefore consider a spell of temporary employment as completed when either
we observe a change in the type of contract or a drop in the uncompleted duration of the
present contract.12
The legislation on FTCs that do not cover temporary, speci…c activities establishes that
workers have a maximum three-year limit of continuous temporary employment with one or
several employers. The three-year limit thus applies to the cumulative duration of successive
contracts, and not necessarily to one and the same contract or employer.13 Two thirds of
the temporary employment spells that we observe start during the survey period, i.e. we
observe the corresponding worker occupying some labor market state other than temporary
employment just prior to the start of his/her FTC. Thus for these the duration of the
current contract and the total cumulated duration of temporary employment coincide, and
the renewal of the current contract is subject to the three-year legal limit. The remaining
third of temporary employment spells in our sample start instead before the survey period,
i.e. we observe the correspondingworker on an FTCatthe …rstinterviewdate, and wecannot
know whether the current contract is the …rst one in the worker’s temporary employment
spell. For these observations, the elapsed duration on the current contract may not coincide
with the elapsed duration in temporary employment. If it does not, we are likely to …nd
more frequent ”early” renewals in our estimates than otherwise. This happens because
someone who has spent, say, one year on the current FTC but three years in the current
12We also computed the duration of …xed term contracts according to a more restrictive de…nition of a
single spell. In particular, we considered a spell as completed when either (i) there is a change in the type
of contract, or (ii) there is a drop in the uncompleted duration of the present contract, or (iii) there is a
change in the sector where the worker is employed. No appreciable change was detected with respect to the
de…nition given in the main text, which is the one we adopt in the empirical analysis reported here.
13While this is true in principle, it is not as clear to what extent this rule is enforced in the practice. It is
probably easier to verify compliance to the rule on a single …rm-worker relationship than on the employment
history of a given worker.
11temporary employment spell is bound to get a contract conversion (or to be dismissed),
and this would show up as a one-year conversion in our estimates, while being in reality a
three-year conversion. It is important to stress that, on the one hand, this problem is limited
to spells that started before the survey period (one third of our observations) and, among
these, to FTCs that were preceded by another FTC in a worker’s employment history. On
the other hand, the existence of cases in which elapsed durations on the current FTC and
on the current temporary employment spell do not coincide implies that our estimate of the
three-year conversion spike is, if anything, a conservative estimate of the true “late” spike.
At the same time this conclusion should be quali…ed by saying that, if on the one hand we
are bound to underestimate the spike at three years, we are also going to overestimate the
spike at one year.
A further issue arises due to the stock nature of our sample. For continuing spells at
the start of the survey period we need to condition on the contract duration, using the
information on the elapsed duration of the current contract that is reported at the …rst
interview. Until the end of 1998, the self-reported elapsed duration up to the interview date
is measured in months if it is lower than one year, and in years otherwise. Starting in 1999,
such information is directly reported in months.
Either method has clear drawbacks. For the period 1987-1998, reported uncompleted
durations are simply equal to the integer of m=12, where m represents the true duration
in months, so that whenever the reported elapsed duration is 1 year, this means anything
between 12 and 23 months; whenever it is 2 years, this means anything between 24 and
35 months, and so on. Such data bunching problem could be eliminated by focusing only
on entrants into temporary employment, who do not have any rounded measure of elapsed
duration attached. However, this would only allow us to observe the time pattern of the
conversion probability for at most six quarters of duration, and would leave us without any
information on the behavior of the hazard towards the legal duration limit of TCs.
We therefore choose to exploit information on all spells, and correct for bunching in the
following way. We convert all durations in quarters, which implies that any individual whose
elapsed duration is 4 quarters or longer reports contract duration e j, which is a multiple
of 4, and to which corresponds a non-rounded duration j 2
n
e j; e j +1; e j + 2; e j + 3
o
: We
thus assume that j is a random draw from a uniform distribution with discrete support
n
e j; e j + 1; e j + 2; e j + 3
o
.14 All observations with e j ¸ 4 are therefore assigned an elapsed
14Note that the assumption of uniform distribution is not restrictive, as j measures the elapsed uncompleted
12duration e j; e j +1; e j + 2 or e j +3 with equal bc probabilities.
While for the period 1987-1998, elapsed durations are heavily bunched but we are given
a clear rounding method, for the later period elapsed durations are in principle not bunched,
as they are directly reported in months, but probably subject to some form of subjective
rounding, whose magnitude is unknown ex ante. Indeed, we observe some small heaps in the
distribution of uncompleted durations in correspondence of multiples of twelve months, and
in particular at 12, 24 and 36 months. On the one hand, aggregating monthly durations up
to quarters alleviates this problem. On the other hand, heaps in correspondence of 12, 24
and 36 months would not systematically bias our estimates of the baseline hazard towards
multiples of 12 months, as what may be rounded is only the elapsed duration at the …rst
interview date, to which one needs to add the non rounded ongoing duration during the
survey period in order to obtain the total contract duration. We therefore simply measure
elapsed contract duration at the …rst interview date converting the reported duration in
quarters. Given that di¤erent rounding methods apply to our data before and after 1998,
and that we deal with them in di¤erent ways, we estimate our duration models separately
for the periods 1987-1998 and 1999-2002.
Each spell of temporary employment can terminate with a new TC, a PC, joblessness, or
it can be censored if the worker is last observed holding the TC at the sixth interview. The
proportion of TCs that terminates with a permanent conversion started around 18% at the
beginningof our sample period and has declined monotonically until 1997 (6%), experiencing
some recovery thereafter, as depicted in Figure 3.
Given that we cannot use an employer identi…er, we are not sure that new PCs observed
in the survey are conversions of previous TCs with the same employer, rather than newly-
created jobs elsewhere in the economy. However, as Figure 1 shows, the fact that over 90%
of all new contracts registered at employment o¢ces have been …xed-term would suggest
that the vast majority of PCs that we observe in the survey are created through conversions
of TCs.
Table 3 reports the distribution of observed spells, according to their destination state.
The …gures reportedsuggest that, atrelatively short durations, TCs aremore likely to end up
into non-employment. As duration proceeds, the probability of non-employment decreases,
while the chances of permanent employment increase. The table also shows evidence of
contract duration, and not the duration for which the contract is initially signed.
13some TCs continuing beyond the legal limit of 3 years.15 While there may be some imperfect
compliance by employers shortly after the 3 years legal limit, we believe that durations much
longer than 3 years should mostly re‡ect measurement error. We therefore treat all durations
longer than 14 quarters as censored at 14 quarters.
It should be noted at this stage that not all TCs in Spain are subject to a legal limit
of three years. In particular, contracts that fall into this category are “General” TCs (also
known as “Employment promotion TCs”) and “Training and Apprenticeship” TCs. Unfor-
tunately the EPA does not allow to single out these two categories among other types of
TCs (“Seasonal”, “Probation”, “Substitution” or “Task or Service” contracts) for the whole
sample period. In particular, for the period 1987-1991, TCs are disaggregated into three
categories (“Training”, “Seasonal”, and “Other”). Starting in 1992, more detail is given
for the “Other” category, which is further disaggregated into “Probation”, “Substitution”,
“Task or Service”, and “Other”. The “General” TCs are classi…ed in the category “Other”
(see also Dolado et al. 2002).
The crucial question for the interpretation of our estimates is then how the inclusion of
contracts other than “General” and “Training” TCs in our sample may a¤ect our estimates.
Clearly, the inclusion of other types of contracts that do not have a three-year legal limit
would lower our estimate of the three-year spike. This can be seen more clearly by looking
at the conversion pattern of each type of contract for the period 1992-2002 (for which a
relatively more disaggregate information on type of contract is available in the EPA). Table
4 shows raw conversion rates by duration for each type of TC. The categories that have
clear spikes at 9-12 quarters (approaching the 3-year duration limit) are the seasonal and
the probation ones (that do not account for a large share of temporary employment anyway)
and the “Other” category. We are thus being conservative in estimating the three-year spike.
Were we able to single out “General” TCs for the whole sample period, we would have found
an even higher spike.
Explanatory variables included in our regressions are individual characteristics such as
gender, age, education, and marital status. Year dummies (referring to the year in which the
individual obtained a conversion or, in case of censoring, to the year in which she was last
interviewed)are also includedin order to capture any timepatterninconversion probabilities
across the Spanish business cycle. Finally, sector dummies and the sectoral unemployment
15In 1993, TCs could be extended for a fourth year (see Appendix A, Table A, note 7).
14rate (measured at the start of the survey period or at the start of the TC if this happened
later) should capture the e¤ect of overall labor market performance, if any, on the conversion
of contracts. Average sample values of these variables are reported in Table 5, for both the
whole sample and each type of destination.
4 Econometric speci…cation
The panel structure of the data set described requires a discrete time hazard function ap-
proach, as outlined in Narendranathan and Stewart (1993) and Jenkins (1995). Suppose
that the transition out of temporary employment is a continuous process with hazard
µi(tjxi) = ¸(t)exp(xi
0¯); (10)
where ¸(t) denotes the baseline hazard, x is a vector of time-invariant explanatory variables,
and ¯ is a vector of unknown coe¢cients. The discrete time hazard denotes the probability
of a spell of temporary employment being completed by time t + 1, given that it was still
continuing at time t. The discrete time hazard is therefore given by
hi(tjxi) = 1 ¡ exp
½
¡
Z t+1
t
µi(ujxi)du
¾
= 1 ¡ expf¡exp(xi
0¯)° (t)g (11)
where
°(t) =
Z t+1
t
¸(u)du (12)
denotes the integrated baseline hazard. We do not specify any functional form for ° (t), and
estimate the model semiparametrically.
The (log) likelihood contribution of a spell of length di is
Li = cilnhi(dijxi) +
di¡1 X
t=1
ln[1¡ hi(tjxi)]
= cilnf1 ¡ exp[¡exp(x0
i¯)° (di)]g¡
di¡1 X
t=1
exp(xi
0¯)° (t); (13)
where ci is a censoring indicator that takes the value 1 if di is uncensored and zero otherwise.
We need to adapt the likelihood contribution (13) to our stock sample. As we observe
spells of temporary employment that started before the survey period, we use self-reported
information to …nd out the quarter in which these spells begun, and we condition transition
rates on the length of temporary employment at the …rst interview date. Suppose that an
15individual i enters the survey after ji quarters of temporary employment and holds the TC
for another ki quarters, for a total duration di = ji + ki, that can be either censored or
uncensored. The individual likelihood contribution becomes
Li = cilnhi(ji + kijxi) +
ji+ki¡1 X
t=ji+1
lnf1¡ hi(tjxi)g
= ciln(1 ¡exp[¡expfx
0
i¯g°(ji +ki)]) ¡
ji+ki¡1 X
t=jt+1
expfx
0
i¯g° (t): (14)
The baseline hazard can be estimated non-parametrically by maximizing the log-likelihood
L =
Pn
i=1Li with respect to the ° (:) terms and the ¯ vector. The vector of controls xi
includes a number of individual and job-related characteristics, which are treated as time
invariant. Appendix C explains in detail how this empirical speci…cation can be brought to
the data when the available measure of duration is bunched.
We next make standard extensions to the econometric model outlined. First, as TCs
can terminate with the conversion into a PC or alternative states, we need to consider a
competing risk model, that distinguishes exits into permanent employment from exits into
alternative states. It can be shown that, if distinct destinations depend upon disjoint subsets
of parameters, the parameters of a given cause-speci…c hazard can be estimated by treating
durations …nishing for other reasons as censored at time of exit (see Narendranathan and
Stewart, 1993). We therefore treat all temporary employment spells that end in a newTCor
in non-employment as censored at the time the …rst contract is terminated. Having saidthis,
the semi-parametric hazard speci…cation (14) used for the single-risk model can be applied
for the permanent job hazard.
Finally, we control for the e¤ect of possibly omitted regressors in the exit from …xed-term
employment by conditioning the hazard rate on an individual’s unobserved characteristics,
summarized into a random disturbance v. The conditional (discrete time) hazard rate is
then written as
hi(tjxi;vi) = 1 ¡ exp[¡exp(xi
0¯ + vi)°(t)] (15)
with vi independent of xi and t. Note however that, in a competing risk framework, allowing
for a random disturbance term in each of the cause-speci…c hazards requires an additional
assumption, namely the independence of these disturbance terms across the cause-speci…c
hazards.16
16The alternative approach would be to assume perfect correlation (as opposed to zero correlation) between
16The conditional likelihood contribution for the ith individual is the given by Lijvi =
cilnhi(ji + kijxi;vi) +
Pji+ki¡1
t=ji+1 lnf1¡ hi(tjxi;vi)g: The unconditional likelihood contribu-
tion (that depends on observable regressors only) is obtained by integrating the conditional
one over vi:
Li =
Z
8
<
:ci lnhi(ji + kijxi;vi) +
ji+ki¡1 X
t=ji+1
ln[1 ¡hi (tjxi;vi)]
9
=
;f(vi)dvi: (16)
Among potential functional forms for f(vi), a very convenient candidate is the gamma dis-
tribution, which delivers a closed form solution for (16) and therefore avoids numerical inte-
gration (see Lancaster 1979; see also Han and Hausman, 1990, andDolton and O’Neill, 1996,
for an application of gamma-distributed unobserved heterogeneity to discrete time hazard
models).
Under these assumptions the individual likelihood contribution is given by
Li = ln
8
> <
> :
2
41+ ¾2
ji+ki¡1 X
t=ji+1
exp(xi
0¯)° (t)
3
5
¡1=¾2
¡ci
2
41+ ¾
2
ji+ki X
t=ji+1
exp(xi
0¯)° (t)
3
5
¡1=¾29
> =
> ;
; (17)
where ¾2 is an extra parameter to be identi…ed.
5 Empirical results
We move on to estimating the econometric model outlined in the previous Section, for the
determinants of worker transitions from temporary to permanent employment. The results
of our estimates are reported in Table 6. These estimates refer to the sample period 1987-
1998, for which we have a consistent measure of contract duration. Separate estimates for
the later period are reported further down in Table 10. Two speci…cations of our regression
equation are provided. In the …rst one we do not allow for unobserved heterogeneity among
individuals. In the second one we control for the e¤ect of possibly omitted regressors by
allowing for a Gamma-distributed disturbance term.
the cause-speci…c disturbance terms (see Narendranathan and Stewart, 1993, for a discussion of advantages
and disadvantages of the two methods).
17The e¤ect of several individual characteristics on conversion probabilities are fairly stan-
dard, and consistent with previous results obtained from logit estimates (see Alba, 1998).
Column I of Table 6 shows that the probability of a permanent conversion increases with
age up to prime age and stays constant afterwards. Being married positively a¤ects the
probability of obtaining a permanent contract. Gender and education have the expected
e¤ects on conversion rates, although they are not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. Industry
dummies show that conversion rates are highest in services and lowest in construction. Time
…xed-e¤ects imply in turn a roughly monotonically decreasing trend in the proportion of
TCs being converted on a permanent basis. Such trend is stronger in the …rst half of the
sample period and then fades away in the late 1990s, consistently with what we observed
in the raw data of Figure 3. Finally, sectoral unemployment has a negative and signi…cant
impact on conversion rates. As lower unemployment implies better outside opportunities for
temporary workers in search for better jobs, it enables them to more credibly threat their
employer in case of low conversion prospects. This is in line with prediction (4) of Section
2. Very similar results (nor reported here) were obtained when using time-varying unem-
ployment rates instead of time invariant. This is not surprising, in the light of the relatively
strong persistence of Spanish unemployment at the quarterly frequencies.
The quarterly steps of the baseline hazard are reported at the bottom of Table 6. In
the estimates provided we impose a constant hazard across steps 9-11 and steps 13-14,
respectively.17 Above 8 quarters of contract duration, step 12 was the only one that was
individually identi…ed. As step 12 coincides with the 3-year legal limit of TCs, the relatively
higher density of completed spells at this duration allowed us to identify this step separately
from adjacent ones.
The parallel estimation that controls for the e¤ect of unobserved heterogeneity is rep-
resented in column II of Table 6. The positive and signi…cant variance of the Gamma-
distributed disturbance shows that there is some residual heterogeneity among individuals,
which is not properly accounted for by included regressors. However, the partial e¤ect of
most regressors remains practically unchanged if compared with the case where no unob-
served heterogeneity is accounted for, as does the global …t of the regression. As there is no
major di¤erence between the estimates of column I and II,18 and the additional restrictions
17We …rst attempted to estimate the fully unrestricted model with 14 baseline steps and found that steps 9-
11 were not separately identi…able, and similarly for steps 13 and 14. See Appendix C for a formal discussion
of identi…cation problems.
18The only change from column I is that step 13 and 14 are not even jointly identi…ed (and when we
18embodied in speci…cation II seem largely unnecessary, in the regressions that follow we do
not allow for unobserved heterogeneity in our estimates.
The predicted hazards corresponding to regressions I and II of Table 6 are plotted in
Figure 4 for a typical temporary worker (single male, aged 16-24, with completed secondary
education, employed in the service sector). Controlling for the presence of unobserved het-
erogeneity in regression II simply scales upward the whole hazard, as it is reasonable to
expect, but hardly changes its overall time pattern. It can be noted that, with both spec-
i…cations, the hazard has some spikes at durations around one, two and three years. This
denotes substantial heterogeneity in the time pattern of conversion rates and is consistent
with prediction (1) of Section 2. As one would expect, TCs are more likely to be converted
at integer yearly durations than otherwise.19
We checked the signi…cance of those spikes using a Wald test for the equality of adjacent
baseline hazard steps. Using the estimates from column 1 of Table 6, we found that, at
durations around one year, the baseline hazard at 4 quarters is signi…cantly higher than
both the one at 3 quarters (Â2 = 70:97, against the critical value Â2(1;0:05) = 3:84), and
the one at 5 quarters (Â2 = 27:69). At durations around two years, the baseline hazard
at 8 quarters is signi…cantly higher than both the one at 7 and the one at 9-11 quarters
(Â2 = 13:68 and Â2 = 37:30; respectively). Finally, at duration around three years, the
baseline hazard at 12 quarters is signi…cantly higher than both the previous and the later
one (Â2 = 37:30 and Â2 = 33:57; respectively). Also, while the spikes at one and two years are
not signi…cantly di¤erent from each other (Â2 = 2:25), the one at three years is signi…cantly
higher than both of them (Â2 = 13:09 and Â2 = 25:23; respectively). Using the estimates
from column 2 of Table 6, which control for unobserved heterogeneity, the spike at two years
disappears, as the step at 8 quarters is not signi…cantly di¤erent from adjacent ones, and
we are left with an early and a late spike in permanent conversions, around durations of one
and three years respectively. As with the previous estimates, the baseline hazard at three
years is signi…cantly higher than at both one and two years.
Di¤erent population groups have di¤erent employment prospects and unemployment
rates, which a¤ect their outside options and thus their bargaining power on temporary
attempted to identify them, the corresponding coe¢cient was virtually zero and the others as those reported
in column II of Table 6).
19Note that minimum durations of TCs are always multiple of quarters, and multiple of years for “General”
TCs from 1992 onwards (see Appendix A). Moreover, starting in 1992, the EPA contains information on the
length of contracts being signed, which displays clear spikes at 1, 2, and 4 quarters.
19jobs. In particular, skilled workers have lower unemployment rates than the less-skilled (see
Dolado et al. 2002b), and Spanish women have higher unemployment rates than males (see
Azmat et al. 2005). We thus estimate separate duration models of temporary employment
for men and women, the skilled and the unskilled.
We …rst split oursample alongthe educational dimension, and de…neas skilledall workers
who have completedsecondary education. Table 7 shows thatwhile skilled women havelower
conversion rates than skilled men, no signi…cant gender di¤erences can be detected among
the less-skilled. The steps of the baseline hazard are shown in the lower part of the Table,
and the predicted hazard is plotted in Figure 5. As expected, the predicted hazard at most
durations is higher for educated workers than for the less-skilled. However, the later spikes,
especially the one at three years, are relatively more important for the less-skilled than for
the skilled. In particular, there is really no early spike for the less-skilled, as the predicted
hazard at 4 quarters is not signi…cantly di¤erent from the one at 5 quarters and the one at
8 quarters is not signi…cantly di¤erent from the one at 7 quarters. The fact that the time
pattern of renewals is everywhere lower and more strongly increasing for the less-skilled than
forthe skilled is inline withprediction (2) of Section(2): skilled workers tendto occupy more
productive job matches, which are thus more likely to be converted before the legal limit.
Also, one would expect thatthe less skilledare generally in a weaker bargaining position than
the skilled, as they may be more easily replaced. Moreover, in a high unemployment scenario,
the skilledmay take up unskilled jobs, crowding out the less-skilled oftheir usual occupations
(see Dolado et al. 2002). In this sense, these results empirically support prediction (4) of
Section (2). Screening and early conversions for successful workers are also more likely to
apply to the skilled rather than the less-skilled, and this is again con…rmed in our estimates.
Some gender di¤erences in conversion rates are detected in Table 8. While age e¤ects
are similar for men and women, education has a positive e¤ect on male conversion rates,
but a negative e¤ect on female ones, and this could explain the non-signi…cant e¤ect found
in Table 6. As education presumably enhances productivity and a worker’s outside options,
we …nd that it has the expected impact on male conversion rates but not on female ones, as
if other unmeasured factors such as, say, labor market attachment, were more relevant than
observable human capital for women’s promotions. It seems moreover that, in the interim
period between the two reforms, conversion rates keep falling for males, while stabilizing for
females. The unemployment rate has similar qualitative impact on conversion rates across
genders, if anything stronger for females.
20The baseline hazard steps for the regressions by gender are reported in the second half
of Table 8, and the corresponding predicted hazards are plotted in Figure 6. In general,
the baseline hazard is higher for males than for females. This would be consistent with
higher outside options for males, and thus more credible threats to quit the current TC
for better opportunities in the labor market. However, the fact that the three-year spike
in conversion rates is signi…cantly higher than both the one- and the two-year spike for
men, while for women all three spikes are not signi…cantly di¤erent from one another, is
not entirely consistent with this story. This would be probably easier to rationalize as the
consequence of lower human capital accumulation on the job by females than by men.
Finally, we assess howthe 1994 and1997reforms a¤ected thetime pattern of conversions.
The 1994 reform was aimed at reducing the applicability of “General” TCs and enhancing
the conversion rates for labor market groups with supposedly poorer labor market prospects.
This mostly took the form of payroll tax reductions for newly-hired workers under permanent
contracts (see Table A). Such incentives to the conversion of TCs can be modeled in our
framework as an increase in the productivity of PCs, or a reduction in …ring costs. The
1997 reform reinforced the 1994 trends by further restricting the use of “General” TCs, and
introducing a new typology of PC with lower …ring costs.20 We noted above that, despite
the reforms, the share of temporary employment did not fall after 1994 (see Figure 2),
but at least stabilized after one decade of sustained increase. Also, the proportion of TCs
being converted into PCs stabilized in 1994 and slightly increased since 1998 (see Figure 3).
We next document this trend in conversion rates, and check whether such overall tendency
conceals diverging patterns for di¤erent labor market segments.
We split our sample into two subperiods, corresponding to di¤erent institutional environ-
ments. These are 1987:2-1994:1 and 1994:3-1998:4.21 Temporary spells are allocated to these
subperiods according to their starting quarter, or the …rst survey quarter if the contract had
already started at the …rst survey date. Although there was a reform in 1997, we provide
pooled estimates for the post 1994 period for two reasons. First, the 1997 reform did not
imply any major discontinuity with respect to the 1994 reform as far as the conversion of
TCs was concerned, and basically strengthened the incentives to permanent conversions of
20For the e¤ects of the 1997 reform on permanent employment, see Kugler et al. (2003). See also García-
Pérez and Muñoz-Bullón (2003) for an analysis of employment transitions in the 1990s for the youth labor
market.
21As the reform was passed in May 1994, it is not clear whether the old or the new legislation applies to
contracts signed exactly in 1994:2, and we therefore drop them from our sample.
21TCs. Second, the post 1997 period would be rather short, from 1998:1 to 1998:4, and would
not allow us to identify the baseline hazard steps for durations longer than one year.
In Table 9 we report results for the pre and the post 1994 periods. Our estimates clearly
show that permanent conversion prospects of women, the less educated and younger workers
have improved after 1994. The female dummy switches from negative and signi…cant in the
…rst sub-period, to positive and signi…cant in the second one, and the reverse is true for
the university education dummy. Conversion rates are reduced for those aged 25-34 and
even more older workers. Interestingly, before 1994 conversion rates are highest for the
middle age category 35-44, but they drop at the same level as for the 16-24 category with
the reform. Targeting subsidies to the conversion of contracts for women (in occupations
in which they are under-represented) and young workers seems to have been e¤ective in
enhancing their prospects of accessing permanent employment. Also, conversion rates after
1994 have strongly deteriorated in construction.
Clearly, the time pattern of conversions is greatly a¤ected after the 1994 reform, as shown
in the lower part of Table 9 and in Figure 7. Before 1994, clear spikes can be detected in
conversion rates around 1, 2 and 3 years, each of them being higher than the previous one at
conventional signi…cance levels. In particular, the permanent conversion probability for the
reference worker after 3 years of temporary employment is twice as high as the one at one
year. Interestingly, after the 1994 reform, there is a small spike in conversion rates at one
year, and after that conversion rates decline steadily, without any later spike. One the one
hand, it can be concluded that the 1994 reform has successfully a¤ected the use of TCs in
the sense of inducing employers to earlier rather than later conversions - consistently with
predictions (2) and (3) of Section 2. On the other hand, it can be clearly noted that, except
at durations of 9-11 quarters, the conversion rates after 1994 are always lower than the ones
for the earlier period. While a¤ecting the time pattern of conversions, the 1994 reform failed
quite badly at pushing higher their average level. One possible reason for this can be found
in the changing composition of temporary employment after 1994. The 1994 reform limited
substantially the applicability of “General” TCs, which were those initially conceived by
the legislator for being converted into PCs. With a declining share of “General” TCs in
total temporary employment, and an increasing share of “Task or Service” contracts, it is
probably not surprising that average renewal rates also declined.
For the last 3 years of our sample, corresponding to 1999-2002, the duration of temporary
employment spells is measured di¤erently from the previous period, as explained in detail
22in Section 3, and duration data are therefore not directly comparable. In particular, as
durations are measured more precisely, we manage to separately identify all quarterly steps
in the baseline hazard. We therefore provide separate estimates for this later period in Table
10. The most noticeable di¤erence from the 1994-1998 period is age e¤ects turning strongly
negative from age 35, possibly due to the impact of the 1990s reforms, targeted at permanent
employment prospects of youths. Also, the gender dummy is now negative and signi…cant,
while the impact of the unemployment rate becomes non-signi…cantly di¤erent from zero.
Finally, the level of conversion rates is lower than in the earlier subsample in correspondence
of all durations. At the same time, the third spike becomes lower than the previous two. The
same tendency towards lower but ‡atter conversion rates that we found for the 1994-1998
period is also detected for this …nal subsample.
6 Conclusions
Given that most accessions to permanent employment in Spain happen through TCs, the
conversion of TCs into PCs is a key aspect of labor market segregation among Spanish
workers and of the overall performance of the Spanish labor market. This paper has studied
the determinants and the timing of the conversion of TCs into PCs in Spain using panel
data for the period 1987-2002, to shed light on the potential of temporary employment as
a stepping stone for stable, regular jobs. Speci…cally, we estimated a duration model for
temporary employment, with ‡exible duration dependence for the permanent employment
hazard.
We argued that the level and the timing of permanent promotions of TCs can be sugges-
tive of di¤erent levels of workers’ outside options. Using a simple framework for …rm’s choice
of conversion rates, we have argued that conversion rates should be higher for workers who
can credibly threat their employer to quit a temporary job. Finally, the pattern of renewals
should be steeper for workers with lower outside options. We …nd that these predictions are
broadly con…rmed by the estimates of our duration model for temporary employment, which
delivers a clear spike at the legal limit, and higher conversion rates in cases where workers
supposedly have higher outside options.
The likely role ofworker outside options is more clearly visible whenwe estimate separate
conversion rates by education, as conversion rates are lower and more steeply increasing with
tenure on temporary jobs for the less-skilled. The results are less clear-cut when we estimate
23separate conversion rates by gender. Men have higher conversion rates, and presumably
better employment prospects than women in the Spanish labor market. However, the fact
that the time pattern of conversions is less steep for women would point in the opposite
direction if one were to assess conversion rates solely on the basis of workers’ threat to quit.
When comparing conversion rates for men and women it is likely that other factors play an
important role over and above outsidelabor market options, namely noneconomic reasons for
quits (see Manning 2003, chapter 7), and thus di¤erent job attachment for the two genders.
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26Table 1: Quarterly transitions across labour market states.
quarter t+ 1
NE PC new TC same TC
NE 96.62 0.48 2.91
quarter t PC 2.20 96.32 1.48
TC 16.26 5.70 13.93 64.11
Notes. Transition rates are computed according to the
distribution of individuals across labour market states at
quarter t + 1, conditional on their status at quarter t.
Source: EPA.
Table 2: Yearly transitions across labour market states.
year t+ 1
NE PC new TC same TC
NE 93.50 1.18 5.31
year t PC 6.01 91.15 2.85
TC 22.98 12.30 44.01 20.71
Notes. Transition rates are computed according to the
distribution of individuals across labour market states at
quarter t + 4, conditional on their status at quarter t.
Source: EPA.
27Table 3: The duration distribution of …xed-term contracts, by state of exit.
duration NE PC new TC same TC Total
(quarters) No. of spells
1 54.33 10.13 13.69 21.85 47,622
2 34.67 8.73 38.80 17.80 38,684
3 28.81 10.67 37.92 22.59 20,751
4 19.53 11.92 46.28 22.27 16,295
5-8 15.53 12.89 27.03 44.55 23,101
9-12 15.90 20.78 22.68 40.64 7,775
>12 13.16 13.63 21.95 51.26 7,864
Total
No. of spells
54,306 18,023 46,673 43,090 162,092
Notes. Each row sums to 100, with each entry giving the probability to exit into any
of the four states, conditional on the contract duration. All our rounded elapsed dura-
tions e j are replaced with random draws from a uniform distribution with discrete support n
e j; e j + 1; e j + 2; e j + 3
o
: Source: EPA.
Table 4: Permanent conversion rates by duration and type of contract, 1992-2002.
duration Training Seasonal Other Probation Substitution Task
(quarters) & Apprent. or Service
1 5.55 3.04 9.16 16.77 5.28 6.08
2 4.86 5.57 8.54 12.47 7.31 6.14
3 5.81 6.83 10.70 10.44 9.42 7.22
4 10.54 9.81 11.98 12.96 9.77 8.14
5-8 10.89 7.55 13.82 8.70 9.61 7.51
9-12 13.67 24.75 21.48 20.00 14.64 10.17
>12 9.83 6.80 6.82 0.00 2.10 4.71
All
durations
7.12 4.79 10.63 13.48 7.12 6.91
Notes. All our rounded elapsed durations e j are replaced with random draws from a uniform
distribution with discrete support
n
e j; e j +1; e j + 2; e j + 3
o
: Source: EPA.
28Table 5: Sample characteristics of temporary workers.
NE PC new TC same TC Total sample
female 45.38 39.99 35.23 41.32 40.95
age 16-24 yrs 41.24 35.96 41.74 41.51 40.87
age 25-34 yrs 26.87 33.12 30.64 28.01 29.08
age 35-44 yrs 15.94 16.49 15.76 16.53 16.21
age 45+ yrs 15.95 12.86 11.86 13.22 13.85
no quali…cation 14.97 8.66 8.05 10.52 11.17
primary education 28.84 28.27 26.87 26.76 27.80
secondary education 46.39 47.47 54.73 45.97 48.92
university education 9.52 13.98 10.28 15.82 11.95
married 40.09 40.57 37.93 36.90 38.95
agriculture 17.66 4.96 7.29 5.29 10.03
manufacturing 15.66 22.23 22.15 18.48 19.06
construction 15.93 12.92 18.86 19.68 17.48
services 50.75 58.31 51.69 55.81 53.44
Average unemp. rate 12.54 10.89 13.09 11.13 12.19
Total No. of spells 54,306 18,023 46,673 43,090 162,092
Notes. All entries (except theaverage unemployment rate)indicate thepercentage ofworkers
with a given characteristic in the sample. Standard deviations in parenthesis. Source: EPA.
29Table 6: Maximum likelihood estimates of the transition from temporary to permanent
employment: 1987-1998.
I II
Characteristics
female -0.019 (0.018) -0.015 (0.021)
age 25-34 yrs 0.194 (0.023) 0.225 (0.025)
age 35-44 yrs 0.152 (0.030) 0.191 (0.036)
age 45+ yrs 0.135 (0.033) 0.170 (0.041)
secondary education -0.014 (0.021) -0.022 (0.025)
university education 0.015 (0.032) 0.015 (0.037)
married 0.101 (0.022) 0.120 (0.026)
manufacturing 0.108 (0.037) 0.085 (0.056)
construction -0.216 (0.023) -0.280 (0.052)
services 0.231 (0.037) 0.252 (0.055)
year 1988 -0.085 (0.047) -0.138 (0.058)
year 1989 -0.333 (0.045) -0.456 (0.058)
year 1990 -0.520 (0.047) -0.693 (0.057)
year 1991 -0.490 (0.048) -0.707 (0.058)
year 1992 -0.678 (0.040) -0.896 (0.056)
year 1993 -0.675 (0.042) -0.885 (0.072)
year 1994 -0.765 (0.044) -1.005 (0.075)
year 1995 -0.729 (0.044) -0.958 (0.069)
year 1996 -0.863 (0.040) -1.109 (0.062)
year 1997 -1.091 (0.047) -1.372 (0.064)
year 1998 -1.122 (0.047) -1.414 (0.059)
year 1999 -1.099 (0.071) -1.350 (0.085)
log log unemployment rate -0.271 (0.057) -0.337 (0.103)
Base line hazard steps
step 1 0.075 (0.007) 0.082 (0.018)
step 2 0.074 (0.007) 0.090 (0.020)
step 3 0.068 (0.007) 0.091 (0.020)
step 4 0.094 (0.009) 0.138 (0.029)
step 5 0.078 (0.008) 0.124 (0.028)
step 6 0.061 (0.007) 0.097 (0.023)
step 7 0.072 (0.008) 0.110 (0.024)
step 8 0.105 (0.013) 0.111 (0.026)
step 9-11 0.055 (0.006) 0.095 (0.023)
step 12 0.147 (0.017) 0.214 (0.050)
step 13-14 0.068 (0.007)
¾2 1.421 (0.110)
mean log-likelihood -0.358 -0.353
No. of obs. 125,077 125,077
Notes: (1) Standard errors in parenthesis; (2) Source: EPA.
30Table 7: Maximum likelihood estimates of the transition from temporary to permanent
employment: High and Low education.
I II
High education Low education
Characteristics
female -0.043 (0.021) 0.027 (0.032)
age 25-34 yrs. 0.190 (0.025) 0.166 (0.047)
age 35-44 yrs. 0.125 (0.043) 0.140 (0.050)
age 45+ yrs. 0.212 (0.062) 0.114 (0.050)
university education 0.038 (0.027) - -
married 0.124 (0.028) 0.070 (0.036)
manufacturing -0.106 (0.078) 0.199 (0.070)
construction -0.419 (0.074) -0.101 ( 0.060)
services -0.004 (0.078) 0.364 (0.070)
year 1988 -0.174 (0.060) 0.027 (0.071)
year 1989 -0.380 ( 0.060) -0.272 (0.071)
year 1990 -0.575 (0.057) -0.449 (0.071)
year 1991 -0.518 (0.058) -0.458 (0.075)
year 1992 -0.738 (0.064) -0.588 (0.071)
year 1993 -0.755 ( 0.088) -0.545 (0.096)
year 1994 -0.771 (0.093) -0.749 (0.096)
year 1995 -0.729 ( 0.080) -0.741 (0.085)
year 1996 -0.864 (0.073) -0.869 (0.090)
year 1997 -1.091 (0.062) -1.122 (0.077)
year 1998 -1.109 (0.060) -1.252 (0.080)
year 1999 -1.135 (0.093) -1.036 (0.145)
log unemployment rate -0.338 (0.142) -0.210 (0.146)
Base line hazard steps
step 1 0.078 (0.024) 0.082 (0.025)
step 2 0.082 (0.025) 0.073 ( 0.020)
step 3 0.078 (0.024) 0.063 (0.019)
step 4 0.115 (0.035) 0.076 (0.023)
step 5 0.085 (0.026) 0.078 (0.024)
step 6 0.070 (0.021) 0.055 (0.017)
step 7 0.075 (0.023) 0.0793 ( 0.026)
step 8 0.114 (0.036) 0.108 (0.035)
step 9-11 0.063 (0.020) 0.049 ( 0.018)
step 12 0.152 (0.050) 0.168 (0.054)
step 13 0.074 (0.023) 0.065 (0.021)
step 14 0.074 (0.023) 0.065 (0.021)
mean log-likelihood -0.360 -0.353
N. of obs. 79,598 45,478
Notes: (1) Standard errors in parenthesis; (2) Source: EPA.
31Table 8: Maximum likelihood estimates of the transition from temporary to permanent
employment: Males and Females.
I II
Males Females
Characteristics
age 25-34 yrs 0.201 (0.029 0.165 0.034
age 35-44 yrs 0.171 (0.039) 0.085 (0.047)
age 45+ yrs 0.108 (0.044) 0.141 (0.054)
secondary education 0.039 (0.027) -0.117 (0.033)
university education 0.164 (0.046) -0.153 (0.038)
married 0.149 (0.028) 0.047 (0.032)
manufacturing 0.120 (0.057) 0.052 (0.109)
construction -0.235 (0.049) 0.282 (0.145)
services 0.194 (0.057) 0.260 (0.107)
year 1998 -0.001 (0.059) -0.226 (0.077)
year 1989 -0.285 (0.060) -0.413 (0.075)
year 1990 -0.490 (0.060) -0.560 (0.074)
year 1991 -0.408 (0.061) -0.605 (0.071)
year 1992 -0.700 (0.057) -0.633 (0.076)
year 1993 -0.669 (0.083) -0.649 (0.107)
year 1994 -0.780 (0.080) -0.701 (0.120)
year 1995 -0.778 (0.074) -0.625 (0.108)
year 1996 -0.914 (0.064) -0.758 (0.086)
year 1997 -1.116 (0.063) -1.021 (0.087)
year 1998 -1.143 (0.057) -1.066 (0.078)
year 1999 -1.092 (0.105) -1.103 (0.113)
log unemployment rate -0.261 (0.122) -0.351 0.185
Base line hazard steps
step 1 0.071 (0.018) 0.069 (0.028)
step 2 0.072 (0.018) 0.066 (0.026)
step 3 0.066 (0.017) 0.062 (0.025)
step 4 0.087 (0.022) 0.092 (0.037)
step 5 0.073 (0.018) 0.074 (0.030)
step 6 0.054 (0.014) 0.063 (0.026)
step 7 0.062 (0.016) 0.076 (0.031)
step 8 0.117 (0.032) 0.075 (0.032)
step 9-11 0.047 (0.012) 0.059 (0.025)
step 12 0.173 (0.049) 0.095 (0.042)
step 13-14 0.071 (0.018) 0.053 (0.021)
mean log-likelihood -0.362 -0.351
No. of obs. 75,527 49,550
Notes: (1) Standard errors in parenthesis; (2) Source: EPA.
32Table 9: Maximum likelihood estimates of the transition from temporary to permanent
employment: Pre 1994 and Post 1994.
I II
Pre 1994 Post 1994
Characteristics
female -0.053 (0.021) 0.056 (0.029)
age 25-34 yrs 0.199 (0.026) 0.133 (0.031)
age 35-44 yrs 0.207 (0.032) 0.007 (0.030)
age 45+ yrs 0.181 (0.041) 0.020 (0.041)
secondary education -0.026 (0.027) 0.036 (0.035)
university education 0.203 (0.040) -0.234 (0.051)
married 0.100 (0.027) 0.099 (0.030)
manufacturing 0.094 (0.060) 0.009 (0.100)
construction 0.067 (0.065) -0.705 (0.043)
services 0.225 (0.064) 0.098 (0.085)
year 1988 -0.108 (0.046)
year 1989 -0.364 (0.046)
year 1990 -0.544 (0.046)
year 1991 -0.521 (0.044)
year 1992 -0.682 (0.056)
year 1993 -0.646 (0.083)
year 1994 -0.728 (0.113)
year 1995 0.025 (0.045)
year 1996 -0.110 (0.049)
year 1997 -0.357 (0.061)
year 1998 -0.438 (0.082)
year 1999 -0.309 (0.114)
unemployment rate -0.432 (0.149) -0.378 (0.185)
Base line hazard steps
step 1 0.059 (0.019) 0.026 (0.008)
step 2 0.046 (0.015) 0.039 (0.011)
step 3 0.044 (0.014) 0.035 (0.010)
step 4 0.051 (0.016) 0.063 (0.018)
step 5 0.043 (0.014) 0.050 (0.015)
step 6 0.032 (0.011) 0.044 (0.013)
step 7 0.047 (0.016) 0.036 (0.012)
step 8 0.085 (0.028) 0.042 (0.016)
step 9-11 0.027 (0.009) 0.039 (0.013)
step 12 0.135 (0.045) 0.027 (0.019)
step 13-14 0.049 (0.016) 0.026 (0.009)
mean log-likelihood -0.430 -0.280
N. of obs. 63,113 59,257
Notes: (1) Standard errors in parenthesis; (2) Source: EPA.
33Table 10: Maximum likelihood estimates of the transition from temporary to permanent
employment: 1998-2002.
Characteristics
female -0.090 (0.034)
age 25-34 yrs 0.035 (0.038)
age 35-44 yrs -0.228 (0.056)
age 45+ yrs -0.255 (0.063)
secondary education 0.112 (0.039)
university education 0.035 (0.041)
marrried 0.079 (0.042)
manufacturing 0.751 (0.265)
construction -0.418 (0.168)
services 0.636 (0.213)
year 2000 0.073 (0.048)
year 2001 0.085 (0.088)
log unemployment rate -0.121 (0.290)
Base line hazard steps
step 1 0.016 (0.008)
step 2 0.026 (0.013)
step 3 0.023 (0.012)
step 4 0.038 (0.020)
step 5 0.031 (0.016)
step 6 0.026 (0.014)
step 7 0.026 (0.013)
step 8 0.042 (0.022)
step 9 0.032 (0.017)
step 10 0.016 (0.008)
step 11 0.015 (0.008)
step 12 0.022 (0.012)
step 13 0.016 (0.008)
step 14 0.011 (0.006)
mean log-likelihood -0.402
N. of obs. 37,015
Notes: (1) Standard errors in parenthesis;
(2) Source: EPA;
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Figure 1: Evolution of the share of …xed-term contracts in new hires, 1985-2002. Source:
MLR (Spanish Ministry of Labor).
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Figure 2: The share of …xed-term contracts (%) in total employment, 1987-2002. Source:
EPA.
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Figure 3: The proportion of …xed-term contracts converted into permanent ones, 1987-2002.
Source: EPA.
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Figure 4: Predicted hazard for the transition from TC to PC, 1987-1998 (see table 6). Ref-
erence category: male, not married, aged 16-24, secondary education, employed in services,
started TC in 1987.
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Figure 5: Predictedhazardforthetransitionfrom TCtoPC, highandloweducation samples,
1987-1998 (see table 7). Reference category: high/low education, not married, aged 16-24,
employed in services, started TC in 1987.
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Figure 6: Predictedhazardfor thetransitionfrom TCto PC, male andfemale samples, 1987-
1998 (see table 8). Reference category: male/female, not married, aged 16-24, secondary
education, employed in services, started TC in 1987.
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Figure 7: Predicted hazard for the transition from TC to PC, contracts started before and
after 1994 (see table 9). Reference category: male, not married, aged 16-24, secondary
education, employed in services.
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Figure 8: Predicted hazard for the transition from TC to PC, 1999-2002 (see table 10). Ref-
erence category: male, not married, aged 16-24, secondary education, employed in services,
started TC in 1999.
38Appendix A: The institutional background
Current legislation on labor contracts is contained in the Worker’s Statute (Estatuto de
los Trabajadores, ET) of 1980, which has since been modi…ed on four occasions with the
1984, the 1994, 1997 and 2001 reforms. The ET of 1980 established priority to contracts
of inde…nite duration and allowed TCs only for jobs which were temporary in their nature
(like for particular projects, e.g. constuction; or seasonal jobs, e.g. tourism). Some forms of
training contracts for young …rst job seekers were also allowed (apprenticeship contracts and
training contracts). Other situations in which TCs were allowed was for eventual increases
in demand or replacement of a permanent worker in case of absence or temporary suspension
of contract. The ET also established the possibility for the Government to use TCs as an
incentive to promote employment. Except in this last situation, a speci…c cause was generally
required in order to sign a TC (“causal” TC).
The 1984 reform exploits this last possibility in an extreme way, and introduces ‡exibility
by extending the applicability of TCs. It introduces a new “General” TC, as well as making
training contracts more ‡exible. After the reform, any worker can be hired on a temporary
basis without the requirement of a speci…c cause. This implies that for any job, employers
can freely choose between a PC or a TC. The 1994, 1997 and 2001 reforms have restricted
the applicability of TC and introduced subsidies for their conversion into PCs. Table A
summarizes the relevant aspects of the Spanish legislation on temporary employment during
the past 20 years. TCs can be characterized according to: i) limits on their duration (upon
expiry, it is not possible to retain the worker under a TC: either the worker is promoted to a
PC or dismissed); ii) eligibility conditions for workers; iii) indemnities at their termination;
and iv) subsidies to …rms.
Appendix B: Possible extensions to the theoretical frame-
work
The simple framework of Section 2 can be extended in a number of ways. First, if wages
are endogenized, they presumably respond to productivity, …ring costs, and workers’ outside
options. In this case changes in productivity induce changes in wages. In order to ensure
@R¤
2=@pi > 0 one simply needs wages adjusting less than one for one to productivity changes.
In order to ensure @R¤
1=@pi > 0, one also needs the impact of productivity on wages on PCs
to be not too large with respect to the corresponding impact on wages on TCs. A natural
way to endogenize wages in this framework would be to introduce a Nash sharing rule, in
which workers appropriate a given share of the total surplus generated by each job match.
In this case, the …rst condition is always satis…ed, as wages have a component that is totally
inelastic to productivity, and simply depends on unemployment income (see Pissarides 2000,
chapter 1). The second condition mostly rests on the magnitude of workers’ share of total
surplus: if this is the same on PCs and TCs (or lower on PCs than TCs), then the condition
of interest is satis…ed. Otherwise, one needs such di¤erence to be not too large.
Higher …ring costs lower wages to be paid on newly-created permanent jobs (see Pis-
sarides 2000, chapter 9), and in order to ensure @R¤
1=@F;@R¤
2=@F < 0 one needs again wages
adjusting less than one for one to changes in F. Finally, higher outside options also increase
39wages, and @R¤
1=@a > 0 if wT
2i is more responsive to outside options than wP
i , such condition
being su¢cient but not necessary. Under the above mentioned Nash sharing rule, better
outside options increase wages on each type of contract by increasing the value of unem-
ployment. As temporary workers experience a higher probability of future unemployment
(through expiry oflegal limits andexogenous separations) than permanent workers, the value
of unemployment (and thus the value of a) would have a stronger impact on wT
2i than on wP
i:
Having said this, our comparative statics results would be robust to the endogenization of
wages.
Second, one could allow labor productivity on temporary jobs to depend on R1 and R2,
to take into account the e¤ect of permanent employment prospects on worker e¤ort and
productivity. While this does not a¤ect our comparative statics results with respect to F
and a, a su¢cient condition for this not to alter the comparative statics results with respect
to p is that p is concave in both R1 and R2.
Finally, learning on-the-jobandspeci…chuman capital accumulation could be introduced.
Inthis case the value of job matches and conversion rates would rise over time and be highest
at the legal limit
Appendix C: Data bunching problems in estimated like-
lihood functions
The generic ° (ji + ki) term in quation (14) is represented by the product between a vector
of duration dummies and a vector of associated coe¢cients, each of dimension 14, given that
we identify at most 14 quarterly baseline hazard steps. Typically, individuals with contract
duration equal to di = ji+ki would have the dth
i element in the vector of duration dummies
equal to one, and the remaining 13 elements equal to zero. Non-censored spells of length
d (with ci = 1 and di = d), allow therefore to identify the dth element in the vector of
coe¢cients, which represents the dth baseline hazard step (see the second row of equation
(14)). And this holds for dth = 1;:::14; in principle allowing us to identify the whole baseline
hazard.
In order to compute dth
i for each individual i, we need to know ji (the elapsed contract
duration at the …rst interviewdate) and ki (the contract duration during the survey period).
While ki is precisely observed during our whole sample period, ji is precisely measured only
in the 1999-2002 subsample.22
In the 1987-1998 subsample, we know ji precisely only for those individuals who report
e ji · 3, and for them the true ji is simply equal to the reported value e ji: For those who report
e ji ¸ 4, the true ji can be anyinteger between e ji and e ji+3; andspeci…cally weassume that ji is
a random draw from a uniform distribution with discrete support
n
e ji; e ji + 1; e ji + 2; e ji + 3
o
,
as described in Section 3: Thus for them total contract duration di = ji + ki is also a
random draw from a uniform distribution with discrete support
n
e di; e di + 1; e di + 2; e di +3
o
;
with e di = e ji + ki: The corresponding vector of duration dummies will have four non-zero
values, equal tobc each, incorrespondence of e di; e di+1; e di+2 and e di+3: If some ofthese values
are higher than 14, we censor them at 14 quarters, which implies adjusting the censoring
22Abstracting here from subjective rounding, which we discussed in Section 3.
40indicator accordingly. Consider for example an uncensored spell with ki = 4 and e ji = 8. The
implied spell duration is therefore 12, 13, 14 or 15 quarters, with equal bc probabilities. In
particular, this spell wouldbe longer than 14quarters withprobability bc, andthe associated
censoring indicator is reduced from 1 to be.
This treatment of spells whose duration is bunched has consequences for identi…cation of
baseline steps associated to durations of 9-14 quarters, for which we need to rely on relatively
long(andtherefore bunched)elapseddurations at the …rstinterviewdate. If completed, these
spells all have non-integer duration dummies, and possibly non-integer censoring indicators.
In other words, the ° (9) ¡ ° (14) terms become more collinear than they would otherwise
be, and their associated censoring indicator may become smaller, which makes it harder to
identify them separately. We will come back to this issue in Section 5.
41Table A: Summary of Legislation on TCs in Spain
Month/Year Contracts Limits on duration Eligible Indemnities Subsidies
introduced1 minimum maximum workers2 at termination to …rms
03/1980 PC inde…nite
n
20 (45) days’ wage per
year worked if fair (unfair)4
“Causal” TC limited3
Training TC - 1 year
(
Secondary edu. degree or above
obtained in the last 2 yrs.
Apprenticeship TC - 2 years
(
Aged 16-18 (except for disabled)
with<secondary edu
08/1984 General TC 6 months 3 years Any unemployed worker5
n
12 days’ wage
per year worked6
Training TC 3 months 3 years
(
Secondary edu. degree or above
obtained in the last 4 yrs.
Apprenticeship TC 3 months 3 years
(
Aged 16-20 (except for disabled)
with<secondary edu
07/1992 General TC 1 year 3 years7 Same as in 1984
05/1994 General TC 1 year 3 years
(
Unemployed aged>45, disabled, LTU8
Any …rm starting a new economic activity
Same as in 1984
8
> <
> :
…scal incentives to hire eligible-UI recipients
and to transform TC into PC
for aged<25 or >45, females9, disabled
Training TC 6 months 2 years Same as in 1984 if they transform TC into PC
Apprenticeship TC 6 months 3 years Same as in 1984
12/1997 New PC inde…nite
(
Unemployed aged 18-29 or >45, LTU,
disabled, TC since 05/199710
n
20 (33) days’ per year
worked if fair (unfair)4
n
…scal incentives to hire eligible workers,
and to transform TC into New-PC
General TC 1 year 3 years Disabled workers if they transform TC into New-PC
Training TC 6 months 2 years Same as in 1984 if they transform TC into New-PC
Apprenticeship TC 6 months 2 years Same as in 1984 if they transform TC into New-PC
07/2001 New PC inde…nite
(
aged 16-29 or >45, females8,
unemp.w/dur>6months,disabled
Same as in 1997
n
…scal incentives to hire eligible workers;
transform TC into New-PC
General TC 1 year 3 years Disabled workers 8 days per year worked6 if they transform TC into New-PC
Training TC 6 months 2 years Same as in 1984 if they transform TC into New-PC
Apprenticeship TC 6 months 2 years Same as in 1984 if they transform TC into New-PCNotes:
1 If not stated otherwise, contracts introduced previously remain available
2As a general principle for eligibility for all types of TCs introduced in 1984, workers have a maximum 3 year limit of continuous temporary employment with one or several employers.
If a worker has been continuously employed on TCs for 3 years, she needs to wait 12 months before being eligible for a new one. Similarly, for …rms this limit binds for a given job,
in the sense that they cannot cover the same position for more than 3 years with TCs. Also, …rms cannot hire a temporary worker if they have reduced their workforce for economic reasons
or their dismissals have been declared unfair in the previous 12 months (in practice, it is di¢cult to assess whether these rules have been e¤ectively enforced).
3Di¤erent limits apply to di¤erent types of “causal” TCs. For a speci…c project: indeterminated but limited. For replacement: duration of leave. For transitory production circumstances:
max 6 months in a year.
4 The fair (unfair) indemnity can be paid for a max. of 12 months (24 months). In case of unfair, forgone wages are also paid. Workers can be …red for disciplinary reasons (without indemnity)
or economic reasons (indemnites indicated in table). Workers always have the right to sue the employer if she disagrees with the dismissal case. Once the case is taken to court, it can be
declared “fair” or “unfair”. Around 72% of cases that go to court are declared unfair (see Galdón-Sánchez and Güell, 2000).
5Workers can be hired to undertake the normal activity of the …rm or a any new economic activity.
6Indemnities to be paid upon expiry of contract. There is no right to sue the employer for unfair dismissal in this case.
7TCs which lasted 3 years and expire between march 3rd and december 31st, 1993, can be extended to a 4th year. After 4 years, …rms get a subsidy if they convert the TC into a PC.
8 LTU refers to long-term unemployed (12 or more months in unemployment).
9Females in professions or jobs in which they are underepresented.
10 Royal Decree Laws 8/97 and 9/97 were approved in May before the December law.
The respective laws from each reform are: law 8/80 (Estatuto de los Trabajadores), law 32/84, law 22/92, laws 10/94 and 11/94; laws 63/1997, 64/97 and 66/97; law 12/2001.